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ABSTRACT. In this paper, I propose a new reading of Phaedo 99b6-d2. My main thesis is 
that in 99c6-9, Socrates does not refer to the teleological αἰτία but to the αἰτία that will be 
provided by a stronger ‘Atlas’ (99c4-5). This means that the passage offers no evidence that 
Socrates abandons teleology or modifies his views about it. He acknowledges, instead, 
that he could not find or learn any αἰτία stronger than the teleological one. This, I suggest, 
allows an interpretation of the Phaedo in which Socrates offers a consistent account of 
the αἰτία of generation and destruction. 
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In the traditional reading of Phaedo 99c6-9, Socrates recognises that he would be 
glad to learn the teleological αἰτία, but he has been unable to find it himself or 
learn it from someone else. Even if there is no consensus regarding how definitive 
or complete, this is taken to imply an abandonment of the teleology that was in-
troduced before (97c4-6; 99c1-3, 99c5-6). In this paper, I propose a new reading of 
the text. My main thesis is that in 99c6-9, Socrates does not refer to the teleologi-
cal αἰτία but to the αἰτία that will be provided by a stronger ‘Atlas’ (99c4-5). This 
means that the passage offers no evidence that Socrates abandons teleology or 
modifies his views about it. He acknowledges, instead, that he could not find or 
learn any αἰτία stronger than the teleological one. This, I suggest, allows an inter-
pretation of the Phaedo in which Socrates offers a consistent account of the αἰτία 
of generation and destruction. 
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Teleological Causation 
In Plato, the terms αἰτία and αἴτιον are often taken as synonyms and translated as 
‘cause’ or ‘explanation.’ In the Phaedo, however, Plato seems to distinguish them.1 
This difference has been characterised in various ways, but the basic idea is that an 
αἴτιον is what is responsible for something, and an αἰτία is whatever links the αἴτιον to 
its deed assigning the responsibility. In other words, one points to the relata, and 
the other to the relation. In particular, Socrates refers to nous (‘intelligence’) 
always as an αἴτιον and reserves the term αἰτία for answers to ‘why?’ questions.2 
I use the terms ‘teleology’ and ‘teleological αἰτία’ to refer to the thoughts intro-
duced by Socrates at 97b8-98b6. The main claim there is that if there is a nous that 
orders everything, it does it in whatever way is best (97c4-6). This includes both a 
reference to an agent, nous, that does the ordering, and to an end, the best order 
possible. In other words, the ‘teleological αἰτία’ refers to a nous as the αἴτιον of a 
deed, which is the order caused by nous. Abusing Aristotelian terminology, what I 
call the teleological αἰτία in the Phaedo, at least in its original formulation, 
includes an efficient and final aspect.3  
Socrates refers back to this teleological αἰτία in 99c1-3 and 99c5-6 to criticise the 
views of some of his predecessors (see T1 below). The context is a passage that 
                                                 
1 Otherwise passages like Phd. 97c do not seem to make sense. Compare Phd. 99b6-c2 
with Cra. 413a4-5; Phlb. 26e3-27a9, 30d3, and especially 30c4-7; Phd. 110e2-6; Resp. 379c3, 
329d3, 468a8; Ti. 18e3, 29d6, 33a6, 38d7, 40b4, 44c7, 47b6, and 63e; Phdr. 229e5-230a6, 
Leg. 896b1 and 967c5; and Grg. 457a3.  
2 Plato extrapolates legal terminology, where αἴτιον points to the ‘culprit,’ i.e. an 
object, person or state of affairs qua responsible for something, and the αἰτία, which 
refers to whatever makes the ‘accusation’ againts the culprit, meaning the object (e.g. 
murder weapon) or causal account that links the culprit with his or her deed. Notice that 
in the way I am characterising the distinction, I am not assuming, like M. Frede (1980) 233 
and J. G. Lennox (1985) 199, that the use of these terms imply a sharp distinction between 
entities and propositional items, but between whatever is held responsible for an effect 
and whatever connects the effect with what was responsible for it, regardless of their 
ontological status. Nor am I assuming that this distinction holds in all dialogues. The ex-
trapolation of legal terminology could be endemic to the Phaedo. Moreover, Plato’s 
formulations may sometimes be elliptic, prolix, or metaphorical, which explains why the 
distinction is not always clear. For the discussion see G. Vlastos (1969) 292–96, T. H. Irwin 
(1983) 130–32, A. Silverman (1992) 99 n. 32, D. Sedley (1998) 114–15, R. J. J. Hankinson 
(1998) 84–85, I. Mueller (1998) 83-84, G. M. Ledbetter (1999) 257-258, M. Ferejohn (2006) 
151, D. Wolfsdorf (2005), and R. Sharma (2009) 137 n. 1.  
3 Occasionally scholars use ‘teleological’ simply as interchangeable with Aristotle’s fi-
nal αἰτία, and here I am using it in a sense that includes a goal and a mover. For a recent 
survey on ancient teleology see J. Rocca (2017).  
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runs from 99b6 to d2, which immediately follow Socrates’ criticism of Anaxago-
ras’ account (98b7-99b4). First, Socrates introduces the two theories and accuses 
them of making the same mistake as Anaxagoras –i.e. confusing the real αἴτιον 
with what is necessary for something to be an αἴτιον. Then, he adds a more gen-
eral criticism against these theories. Next, Socrates announces his own general 
proposal, labelling it a δεύτερο̋ πλοῦ̋ (‘second sailing,’ 99c6-d2).4 The accounts 
introduced in the first section of the passage have received relatively little atten-
tion but the latter is a locus classicus that has been widely discussed.5 The Greek 
reads as follows: 
 
       T1. (i) διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τι̋                  6 
δίνην περιτιθεὶ̋ τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν 
γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα 
ὑπερείδει· (ii) τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡ̋ οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι  c 
δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ 
οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, (iii) ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου 
Ἄτλαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ 
μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, (iv) καὶ ὡ̋ ἀληθῶ̋ τὸ   5 
ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. (v) ἐγὼ 
μὲν οὖν τῆ̋ τοιαύτη̋ αἰτία̋ ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴ̋ ὁτουοῦν 
ἥδιστ’ ἂν γενοίμην· (vi) ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτη̋ ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ’ 
αὐτὸ̋ εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷό̋ τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν 
δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆ̋ αἰτία̋ ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευ-  d 
μαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβη̋;6 
 
The text can be translated as follows: 
(i) That is also why one person surrounding the earth with a vortex makes it stay 
under the heavens, while someone else puts air under it as a base as if the earth were 
                                                 
4 For the discussion of the translation and interpretation of this locution, see note 23. 
5 For the first section see J. T. Bedu-Addo (1979), D. Sedley (1989), C. J. Rowe (1993) 
237–38, A. Gregory (2001) 84–86, and A. Mason (2013) 206–8. But notice how K. Dorter 
(1982) 117–20, D. Bostock (1986) 142–46, and H. H. Benson (2015) 103, 192 skip sentence (i). 
The interest in the second part of the passage goes back to Aristotle (Gen. corr. 2.9, 335b9-
17, 18-23; Metaph. 1.9, 991b1-9; cf. 13. 5, 1080a) but recent discussions can be traced back to 
the end of the ninetieth century. 
6 Greek edition by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, & J. C. G. 
Strachan (1995).  
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a flat kneading-trough.7 (ii) As for their capacity for being in the best place as they are 
now, this they do not look for nor do they believe it bears any divine force, (iii) but 
they suppose they might discover an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this that 
holds everything together, (iv) and they do not believe that the good and binding 
truly binds and holds anything together. (v) Now I would most gladly become anyone’s 
student to learn what is such αἰτία. (vi) However, since I was deprived of it and was not 
able either to find it myself or to learn it from someone else, would you like me to give you 
a presentation, Cebes, of how I pursued my second sailing in search of the αἰτία?8 
Today, many scholars agree that this passage signals an abandonment of the 
teleological αἰτία, in favour of a new type of formal αἰτία. Paul Shorey (1888, 406, 
1933, 179) and N. R. Murphy (1936, 1951, 145–48) introduced this reading, but it was 
not until the second half of the twentieth century that it became predominant. I 
shall call it the ‘non-teleological reading.’ Consider, for example, the confident 
remarks of one of its most influential advocates, Gregory Vlastos (1969) 297–298:9 
T2. Note that the reference of ταύτη̋ in C8 (the object of ἐστερήθην and also, with the im-
plied change of case, of the infinitives εὑρεῖν, μαθεῖν) is to τοιαύτη̋ αἰτία̋ in C7; what Socra-
tes has failed to discover by his own labours or from those of others and is prepared to do 
without for the present is the teleological αἰτία itself. This leaves no room for understand-
ing him to mean (as has been done over and over again in the literature) that his ‘second-
best journey’ is (a) an alternative method of searching for teleological αἰτίαι rather than 
(b) an alternative method of searching for αἰτίαι. The text offers no direct support for (a), 
since nothing is said of different methods of looking for teleological αἰτίαι (the natural phi-
losophers were condemned for failing to look for such αἰτία, not for looking for them by 
the wrong method). 
Although the non-teleological interpretation has been so successful that it is often 
taken as the default reading of the passage,10 not everybody is convinced that the 
                                                 
7 J. Burnet (1911) 107 suggests reading καρδοπίῳ, the lid of a kneading-trough, instead 
of καρδόπῳ, as a more plausible candidate for something being supported by air. See also 
A. Gregory (2016) 148. 
8 G. Stallbaum (1850) thinks that ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ at b7 should be read with δίνην, 
comparing the construction to 110e4–5 ὑπὸ σηπεδόνο̋ καὶ ἅλμη̋ ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο 
συνερρυηκότων. However, I follow K. F. Hermann’s (1851-3) suggestion of taking it with 
μένειν. See also W. D. Geddes (1863), R. D. Archer-Hind (1883), H. Williamson (1904), and 
J. Burnet (1911). 
9 See also P. M. Huby (1959), C. C. W. Taylor (1969) 45–59, E. L. Burge (1971), and C. 
Stough (1976). 
10 Take for example J. Annas (1982), K. Dorter (1982) 120, D. L. Ross (1982) 23–25, J. G. 
Lennox (1985), D. Bostock (1986), F. Fischer (2002), S. Kelsey (2004) 38–39, M. N. Byrd 
(2011) 148, A. Mason (2013), D. Ebrey (2013), and H. H. Benson (2015) 92–112, 191–92. 
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abandonment of teleology is definitive.11 Moreover, the idea that, in the Phaedo, Soc-
rates does not completely give up on teleology—call this the ‘teleological interpre-
tation’—has always had a significant support.12 
One common complaint is that the non-teleological interpretation ignores the 
wider context of the passage. It has been argued, for example, that such an 
interpretation makes Socrates abruptly change the original topic of discussion from 
the αἰτία of generation and destruction (95e-96a) to one about formal αἰτίαι. Yet, 
Socrates had announced the need for a thorough and exhaustive investigation into 
the former (95e10-96a1), something that is left incomplete if there is an abandonment 
of teleology. There are also various ways to understand the second sailing as 
including a teleological component. For example, David Sedley (1998) 126–27 
thinks that the teleological causation is just a special application of the formal 
αἰτία. Gail Fine (1987) 396, in turn, argues that forms apart from formal, might also be 
final αἰτίαι. 
A second objection against the non-teleological interpretation consists in 
arguing that T1 offers evidence to think that Socrates is not completely deprived of 
the teleological αἰτία. One reason to think this is that ὡ̋ ἀληθῶ̋ at 99c5 suggest that 
Socrates already knows ‘the good and binding.’13 Another reason, perhaps the 
most influential observation against the non-teleological reading, is a remark—
given first by J. T. Bedu-Addo (1979) 105–6 and later by David Wiggins (1986) 3—
about the translation of the aorist ἐστερήθην at c8. The argument is that for the 
non-teleological reading to work, the text would require a perfect tense (i.e., 
ἐστέρημαι instead of ἐστερήθην) to, in Wiggins’ words, ‘carry an implication of 
resignation or acquiescence.’ However, they argue, in the aorist, this connotation 
is not present. Therefore, Socrates says only that at the time, he was denied the 
teleological αἰτία, not that it was permanently out of his reach. As a consequence, 
they think that it is perfectly possible to understand the second sailing as a fresh 
start in the search for the teleological αἰτία or at least as a proposal that is not com-
pletely divorced from a teleological component. 
However, I think that these arguments against the non-teleological reading can be 
resisted. First, Vlastos and others were completely justified in translating the aorist 
ἐστερήθην as a perfect. As Herbert W. Smyth (1956) 432–433 puts it, ‘In the Greek the 
aorist, which simply states a past occurrence, is often employed where English uses 
                                                 
11 See, for instance, M. M. McCabe (1998) and C. J. Rowe (1993) 237–39. 
12 See, for instance, E. Zeller (1922) II, i, 687, n. 1, R. S. Bluck (1955) 13–16, 111–13, 160–73, 
198–200, (1957) 21–31, I. M. Crombie (1963) 161, T. Gould (1963) 77, M. J. Cresswell (1971), D. 
Gallop (1975) 146–47, J. T. Bedu-Addo (1979), G. Fine (1987), D. Sedley (1989; 1998), D. 
Wiggins (1986), Y. Kanayama (2000) 87–100, and A. Gregory (2001) 85–87. 
13 See J. T. Bedu-Addo (1979) 106. 
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the perfect denoting a present condition resulting from a past action […] the aorist 
may be translated by the perfect when the perfect has the force of a present.’14 Sec-
ond, ὡ̋ ἀληθῶ̋ at 99c5 does not really imply that Socrates knows the good and 
binding. If S reports that P does not believe that x ὡ̋ ἀληθῶ̋ y, this does not imply 
that S believes it does.  
Moreover, if some teleological component survives in the formal αἰτίαι of the sec-
ond sailing, it is only in a tenuous way since there is no explicit reference to a teleo-
logical agent after T1, and even if there are some other teleological elements in it, a 
non-teleological reading of T1 could still stand. This is so, because it is possible, 
for example, that Socrates is only abandoning the specific type of teleological 
αἰτία he introduced at the beginning (97c4-6). 
Finally, to the complaint that the non-teleological reading implies a sudden 
change of topic, it could be argued that Socrates’ announcement of the need for an 
exhaustive and thorough investigation does not commit him to offering any conclu-
sions. Besides, although forms are not the αἰτία of generation and destruction they 
were part of Socrates’ investigation into this topic, and crucially, turned out to be the 
piece of the discussion that offered ‘something useful’ (96a2) to answer Cebes’ objec-
tion (86e-88b), which is what prompted the whole autobiographical passage.  
Unfortunately, the non-teleological reading is still unsatisfactory in certain 
respects. First, because even if there is a way to justify the change of topic, it 
might still seem disappointing that Socrates would fail to provide at least a basic 
sketch of the αἰτία of generation and destruction, particularly after so long a discus-
sion into the topic. Second, a Socratic abandonment of the teleological αἰτία seems 
suspiciously out-of-character, especially if we take into account the dramatic 
setting: the last hours of Socrates’ life. Moreover, elsewhere in the Platonic corpus 
and in Xenophon, Socrates seems always fully committed to teleological αἰτίαι 
and agents.15 In no other place Socrates’ makes reference to a period of his life 
when he abandoned teleological αἰτίαι. Finally, as I show in the next section, the 
standard reading often glosses over and dismisses the careful discussion of those 
                                                 
14 Some of the examples offered by Smyth are παρεκάλεσα ὑμᾶ̋, ἄνδρε̋ φίλοι “I (have) 
summoned you, my friends”, Xen. An. 1.6. 6; ὁ μὲν τοίνυν πόλεμο̋ ἁπάντων ἡμᾶ̋ τῶν 
εἰρημένων ἀπεστέρηκεν· καὶ γὰρ πενεστέρου̋ ἐποίησεν καὶ πολλοὺ̋ κινδύνου̋ ὑπομένειν 
ἠνάγκασεν καὶ πρὸ̋ τοὺ̋ Ἕλληνα̋ διαβέβληκεν καὶ πάντα̋ τρόπου̋ τεταλαιπώρηκεν ἡμᾶ̋ 
“now the war has deprived us of all the blessings that have been mentioned; for it has 
made us poorer, compelled us to undergo many dangers, has brought us into reproach 
with the Greeks, and in every possible way has caused us suffering”, Isoc. 8. 19; and 
ἔκτησό τε αὐτὸ̋ τά  περ αὐτὸ̋ ἐκτήσαο “keep thyself what thyself hast gained”  Hdt. 7. 29 
(Smyth’s translations). 
15 See, e.g. Philebus 23b5-27c2, 30a9-e3; Republic 6 and 10; Xen. Mem. 1.4 and 4.3. 
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who posit αἰτίαι for the stillness of the earth at 99c1-6. Yet, Socrates’ criticisms to 
these views depends on a contrast that assumes he is as committed to the 
teleological αἰτία as ever.  
These complaints do mean that the non-teleological reading is not, strictly speak-
ing, a valid reading of the Greek and even a plausible philosophical interpretation. 
The question, however, is whether it is the best one. My suggestion is that we can do 
better. 
In the next sections I argue for a more radical teleological reading of T1 and 
explain some of its advantages. I start by rejecting the widespread assumption 
that τοιαύτη̋ αἰτία̋ at 99c7 refers to the teleological αἰτία at 99c1-3, c5-6. Instead, I 
argue, it refers to the αἰτία at 99c4-5. As I mentioned at the beginning, this means 
that the passage does not imply an abandonment of teleology at all or of any kind 
(not even partial or temporary, as in previous teleological interpretations). This 
new reading, I argue, avoids the objections to previous teleological readings and 
preserves all the advantages of the non-teleological reading. Furthermore, it ena-
bles an interpretation where Socrates succeeds in providing an interesting causal 
account of generation and destruction. 
 
A Problematic Assumption 
Everyone I am aware of, regardless of the interpretation they support, assumes that 
τοιαύτη̋ αἰτία̋ at c7 refers back to the teleological αἰτία (c1–3, c5–6). According to 
this view, Socrates would have gladly become a student of anyone with such 
knowledge of teleology, but could not find anyone. For this reason, he went on to 
propose a second sailing in the search of the αἰτία. Whether there is a complete and 
definitive abandonment of teleology or not may be a debated issue, but everyone 
concedes that Socrates says he abandoned the teleological αἰτία he was looking for. 
I thus call this the ‘traditional reading’ of T1. 
However, I will show, if this reading were correct, Socrates would be simultane-
ously undermining his own criticism to the theories found in T1–which I will call the 
‘Atlas theories’–and making an unmotivated concession. And as a result, Socrates 
fails to properly motivate the need for his second sailing. 
First, I will explain why in the traditional interpretation Socrates is undermining 
his own criticism to the Atlas theories. In the sentence immediately preceding his 
alleged abandonment of teleology, Socrates describes the Atlas theories and its αἰτίαι 
by comparing them with the teleological αἰτίαι he introduced back in 97b8–98b6. 
Socrates’ reference to Atlas, a titan of the pre-Olympic era, is a good indication of the 
strong contrast between the two αἰτίαι. Atlas is the god of astronomy who defied Zeus 
in the Titans’ revolt, and after the Olympic gods won, was condemned to hold up the 
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sky for all eternity.16 This suggests that the teleological nous is an Olympic, heavenly, 
divine force, whereas the power of Atlas is, on the contrary, brute and physical. By 
comparing the missing αἴτιον with Atlas, Socrates is implying that those who look for 
it are joining forces with the loser’s side. At the end of the Titanomachia, it was Zeus 
who commanded Atlas to hold up the heavens, so in reality his decision is behind 
Atlas’ labours too. Thus, the mythological reference signals that those who have 
abandoned and remain unconvinced about teleology are the Atlas theorists, which 
fool themselves thinking that they will find a champion to overthrow the divine or-
der imposed by nous.17 
With this in mind, take a look again to 99c1–6 (in T1). The sentence is a compound 
with three independent clauses (ii-iv). I quote the lines again: 
[T1, part] (ii) τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡ̋ οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην 
οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, (iii) ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα 
ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, (iv) καὶ ὡ̋ 
ἀληθῶ̋ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. 
(ii) As for their capacity for being in the best place as they are now, this they do not 
look for nor do they believe it bears any divine force, (iii) but they suppose they might 
discover an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this that holds everything 
together, (iv) and they do not believe that the good and binding truly binds and holds 
anything together (99c1–6). 
In the first and last clause (i.e., ii and iv), Socrates points out that the authors of 
the Atlas theories do not care about or believe in his teleological αἰτία. The middle 
adversative clause (iii) tells us, instead, that they believe in a different αἰτία, which 
                                                 
16 Hesiod describes Atlas’ punishment as follows: ‘Iapetus married Clymene, Ocean’s 
beautiful-ankled daughter, and went up into the same bed with her. She bore him Atlas, a 
strong-hearted son [...] And by mighty necessity Atlas holds up the sky with his head and with 
his tireless hands, standing at the limits of the earth in front of the clear-voiced Hesperides; 
for this is the portion which the all-wise Zeus assigned him.’ Hes. Theog. 507–20; transl. G. 
W. Most (2006) with minor modifications. See also lines 746–50, Hom. Od. 1.52–4, and 
Aesch. PV 347–20, 445–30. Pindar, in turn, describes the scene as follows: ‘The cruellest 
thing, they say, is to know the good but to be forced to stand apart from it. And in truth he, 
like Atlas, now struggles under the weight of heaven, far from his own land and possessions; 
and yet immortal Zeus set the Titans free again.’ Pind. Pyth. 4.286-92; transl. A. Verity 
(2007). 
17 H. Williamson (1904) and J. Burnet (1911) take τούτου at c3 as masculine with 
reference to Atlas. Hence, they translate ‘an Atlas stronger and more divine than the true 
Atlas.’ This other ‘true Atlas’ would be the teleological αἰτία. However, this makes the 
specific allusion to the Titan Atlas completely irrelevant. I take τούτου, instead, as a 
neuter that refers back to ταύτην (τὴν δύναμιν) at c2. 
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they have not yet discovered, but that will be stronger and more permanent than 
what teleology has to offer. 
Given this contrast between the teleological αἰτία, the Atlas theorists’ scepticism 
towards it and their supposition that they will find another type of αἰτία, it would not 
make any sense for Socrates to abandon his own teleological proposal in the next 
sentence. It would be like someone who proposed a search party for a missing per-
son, criticised those who did not want to join the search, only to abandon the effort 
immediately after. Socrates criticism of the Atlas theories hangs on contrasting their 
general views with his own teleological proposal. 
Moreover, an abandonment of the teleological αἰτία in T1 would mean an unmoti-
vated concession made completely out of the blue. None of the criticisms against 
Anaxagoras reject Socrates’ idea that if there is a nous, it orders in whatever way is 
best. Anaxagoras simply does not seem to share such a teleological premise, but nei-
ther does he prove, show or give Socrates reason to think that things are not ordered 
in whatever way is best. All Anaxagoras does is to talk about other αἴτιαι, which Soc-
rates rejects. Now, one could say that Anaxagoras certainly deprived Socrates of 
many of the teleological αἰτίαι he wanted to learn, for instance, those concerning the 
celestial bodies, but it simply does not follow from there that there should be an 
abandonment of the teleological αἰτία in general or of the specific version proposed 
by Socrates. Thus, if Socrates abandons teleology, he behaves like a student who 
abandons algebra because he had a disappointing experience with his first teacher. 
Besides, there is evidence that Socrates found at least two successful teleological 
αἰτίαι: the real αἰτία of why he stayed in jail and why the Athenians condemned him 
(98e1–99a4; T4, quoted in p. 100 in the last section). Socrates shows no doubts or res-
ervations when conversing with his friends in prison, in thinking that the Athenians 
thought that it was better to condemn him, and that as a result he thought it was bet-
ter, that is, more just, to stay and suffer the penalty imposed. He also uses these cases 
to assess and discard Anaxagoras’ actual αἰτίαι, which shows that Socrates had al-
ready found some teleological αἰτία at the time he first assessed Anaxagoras. As a 
consequence, it would be inaccurate for him to say he was deprived of the teleologi-
cal αἰτία in general or that he was not able to find any. If this were true, at the very 
least, Socrates would have needed some clarificatory note. Yet, he says nothing.18 
                                                 
18 That the Socrates prison example counts as a successful teleological αἰτία might be 
deemed controversial. One could object that Socrates’ nous is not ordering everything or that 
his actions only involve what he thinks is best and not what is actually best. However, this 
objection assumes that ‘everything’ (πάντα) in 97c means ‘everything at once’. Yet, the fol-
lowing lines (see τὰ πράγματα at 98c1 and περί ἐκάστου at 97c7) suggest a weaker reading 
of ‘everything’, where nous orders ‘each concrete thing separately’ (for πάντα to clearly 
mean ‘everything at once’ the text would require a ἅμα that is not in the Greek). Concern-
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 Finally, given that the traditional reading leaves the general views of the Atlas 
theories unchallenged, Socrates fails to reject the Atlas theories. Thus, he does not 
have enough grounds to motivate his second sailing, which is presented as a last 
resort. Consider it in this way. The Atlas theorists’ wariness about ‘the good and bind-
ing’ raises a fair question. Why is nous and a teleological account of its capacity bet-
ter than a simpler, non-teleological, account of the workings of the cosmos?19 Why 
should we assume that Socrates’ teleology is more explanatory in general if, so far, 
it seems its success is limited to the human sphere? 
If, so far, Socrates’ teleological project is unable to account for natural phenomena 
where humans are not involved, it might be a good idea to abandon it in favour of the 
hope of a more conservative solution to the problems of the natural inquiry tradition. 
The Atlas theorists’ promise is that the Atlas will offer a more general, permanent, 
and tight account of generation and destruction, which will provide stable 
knowledge and universal explanations without having to assume Socrates’ teleology. 
In the traditional reading of the passage, however, Socrates does not explain why this 
was not a valid alternative for him and he offers no counterargument.20  
All this raises a question: if the traditional reading is so problematic, why is it 
unanimously assumed as correct? The answer is threefold. First of all, it is a 
grammatically possible reading of the Greek. Second, some seem to take τοιαύτη̋ 
αἰτία̋ to refer back, not to all the elements of the teleological αἰτία, but specifically to 
                                                                                                                              
ing what the best is, 97c leaves open the question on whether it is best for each thing, the 
whole or both. We get no indication about for whom it is best, or if the ordering is the 
best simpliciter. Another way to resist the prison example as a successful teleological 
αἰτία is to argue that in 97c Socrates is only referring to a concrete cosmic nous and not to 
the universal concept, which would apply to all types of nous. This is not an uncommon 
interpretation. See D. Bostock (1986) 143, D. Sedley (2007) 88 and A. Mason (2013). How-
ever, scholars reading the text in this way are forced to say that Socrates’ explanation of his 
nous as the thing responsible for his staying in prison is some kind of analogy. Yet, the text 
does not present human nous in this way at all.  
19 In fact, the Atlas theories do not need to be completely free from teleology, only from 
the type of teleology proposed by Socrates. A teleology based on order or functions that do 
not mention the agent’s intentions may be compatible with their research programme. For 
different senses of teleology in this context, see M. M. McCabe (2000) 185–93. 
20 One might object that since the Atlas theorists made the same mistake that Anaxag-
oras did, from the start we know that these theories cannot be the source of the 
knowledge that Socrates is looking for. Therefore, there is no need for him to reject their 
hope of finding a stronger Atlas. Reading the text in this way, however, cannot account 
for 99c1-6. To reject the Atlas theories, it would be enough to know that they offer a vor-
tex and air as αἰτίαι of the stillness of the Earth. There would be no need to describe them 
any further. 
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the good and binding, which they take, in turn, as a direct reference to the form of the 
good in the Republic. And if that were right, it would be plausible to think that Socra-
tes could deny knowledge of such form, even if he does not really mean it. Finally, the 
traditional reading is attractive because, in it, Socrates may be changing or broaden-
ing his discussion from the search of the αἰτία of generation and destruction to a 
more general search for αἰτία. This would, at least to some extent, fend off the text 
from Aristotle’s seemingly demolishing criticism that in the Phaedo forms are posited 
as adequate αἰτίαι of generation when that is clearly wrong (I shall come back to this 
point in the next section).21 
Of course, that the traditional reading is grammatically possible does not mean it 
is the only one, or that, given the specific context, is the one that makes more sense. 
For instance, the good and binding seems more plausibly an epithet for Socrates’ 
teleological nous (98a7-9), than a reference to the form of the good. Moreover, 
although it is true that the traditional interpretation is a better option than 
reading the text with Aristotle,22 it relies on the far-fetched assumption that αἰτία 
at 99d1 is a cue for a more general discussion on causation rather than a reference 
to the original search for the αἰτία of generation and destruction as we would 
expect given the context. 
To all this one may wonder if it is possible to read the text in a way that avoids 
Aristotle’s objection but also the problems of the traditional reading. In what 
follows, I will provide such a reading. To show this, I first explain and defend my 
interpretation of the Greek text. Then, I explain how in my proposal, Socrates 
incorporates the general views of the Atlas theorists into the discussion. Finally, I 
explain how my reading does a better job at shielding the text from Aristotle’s 
objections and opens new directions for understanding the ‘second sailing.’ 
 
A Reference to the Missing Atlas 
Consider the possibility that τοιαύτη̋ αἰτία̋ refers back, not to the teleological, but 
to the αἰτία that the Atlas theories suppose they might discover (99c3–5). Taken in 
this way, Socrates says that he would have gladly become anyone’s student to 
learn what this missing Atlas is, something that, if found, would allow a more su-
perior αἰτία than the teleological one. Thus, in this reading, Socrates is not aban-
doning teleology at all, but rather is conceding the counterfactual that if the Atlas 
theorists could deliver the knowledge of their Atlas, he would be happy to learn 
                                                 
21 See Arist. Gen. corr. 2.9, 335b9–17, 18-23; Metaph. 1.9, 991b1–9, see also 13.5, 1080a. 
22 Aristotle’s reading is not impossible or even implausible, but I take it that it is not 
the most charitable. For a defense of Aristotle’s reading of the Phaedo see J. Annas (1982). 
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from them. But since that has not happened, and Socrates has not been able to 
find a stronger αἰτία than the teleological one, that door remains closed. 
The proposal offers some advantages over previous teleological readings. First, the 
translation of ἐστερήθην at c8 is no longer a problem. Even if translated as a 
perfect, it does not refer to the teleological αἰτία, but rather to the promised Atlas. 
Moreover, since read in this way, there is no evidence of Socrates abandoning, or 
modifying his views on teleology, the lack of explicit mentions of it in the second 
sailing need not be a problem; it could just mean that the original formulation of 
teleology is implied throughout the entire section.23  
I shall come back to the last point later, but first notice that nothing really pre-
vents my proposed reading of the Greek (i.e., taking τοιαύτη̋ αἰτία̋ as a reference to 
the Atlas). Pronouns like τοιοῦτο̋, -η, -ο generally refer to what precedes them, point-
ing to something near in place, time or thought. But, as I have noted, in our passage, 
the sentence that runs from 99c1–6 is a compound with three independent clauses, 
so τοιαύτη̋ αἰτία̋ could perfectly refer to any object or element in any of these claus-
es. Now, the most proximate element it can pick up is the good and binding, but that, 
as I have argued, would put Socrates in a difficult spot.24 Thus, it makes better sense 
that Socrates refers to the knowledge of the Atlas, since in this way Socrates would 
not undermine his contrast and criticism of the Atlas theories. 
What distinguishes the Atlas theorists from other natural inquirers is their inter-
ests in finding a definitive answer for the generation and destruction of things. They 
believe they will discover something that holds everything together. In contrast, their 
answers to explain the stillness of the earth are unoriginal. More than one posited air 
or vortex to explain why the earth stays in its place. But it is novel and striking that 
they are explicitly unpersuaded and uninterested on teleological αἰτίαι and its divine 
                                                 
23 One might wonder how this interpretation sits within the discussion of the mean-
ing of δεύτερο̋ πλοῦ̋ (translated here as ‘second sailing’). This locution has been taken to 
mean either second-best method of inquiry or an answer to the αἰτία of generation and 
destruction or both. But it has also been taken to mean ‘second attempt’, without any 
negative connotation (or second-best, only ironically). For a recent discussion and rele-
vant literature, see H. H. Benson (2015) chap. 4. I would argue that my reading of T1 is 
compatible with both translations and at least some of the options above. In the next 
section, however, I suggest it could also mean a second attempt at investigating the αἰτία 
of generation and corruption, which consists of connecting the teleological agent with its 
deeds. Then the first sailing would be Socrates’ attempt at learning it from someone else, 
whereas the second one is Socrates showing how he found the knowledge on his own. 
24 Moreover, the pronoun τοιοῦτο̋ does not need to pick up the most proximate element. 
See, for example, τοιαῦτα at 99a5. 
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source, while believing that they will be eventually able to provide better answers.25 If 
they could deliver their promise, it would be a remarkable contribution, even if they 
have inadequate terminology when it comes to the details. But all this is unproblem-
atic in my reading of sentences (v) and (vi) since, Socrates would simply concede that 
he is open to learn from such remarkable knowledge that no one has yet found. 
The Atlas theorists seem to be taking their hope in the missing Atlas as a work-
ing hypothesis. This explains why they are unpersuaded about teleology and offer 
non-teleologial αἰτίαι. Their argument could be reconstructed as follows: 
a. There is an Atlas stronger and more immortal [than the things’ capacity 
of being in the best place] to hold everything together (iii; 99c3–5) (Assumption). 
b. If that is so, then there is no need to believe that the good and binding 
(i.e., nous) truly binds and holds things together (iv; 99c5–6). 
c. If there is no need to believe that the good and binding truly binds and 
holds things together, then there is no need either to look for the things’ capacity 
of being in the best place as they are now or to think this capacity bears any di-
vine force (ii; 99c1–3). 
d. If there is no need to either look for the things’ capacity of being in the 
best place as they are now or think this capacity bears any divine force, then ei-
ther a vortex surrounding the earth keeps it under the heavens or air is under the 
earth as a base as if the earth were a flat kneading-trough (i; 99b6–7). 
e. If there is an Atlas stronger and more immortal [than the things’ capacity 
of being in the best place] to hold everything together, then either a vortex sur-
rounding the earth keeps it under the heavens or air is under the earth as a base 
as if the earth were a flat kneading-trough (HS from b–d). 
f. Therefore, either a vortex surrounding the earth keeps it under the heav-
ens or air is under the earth as a base as if the earth were a flat kneading-trough 
(MP from a, and e). 
                                                 
25 Commentators usually suggest Empedocles and Anaxagoras as the possible authors 
of the Atlas theories (Arist. Cael. 300b2–3, 295a9-21, 294b13–17). Other possible candi-
dates include Anaximander (Simpl. in Cael. 2.13, 532, 13–14), and the atomists (Phi-
loponus, in Phys. 262.8–13 and again Arist. Cael. 294b13–17). Anaxagoras himself talks 
about a vortex surrounding the earth and air supporting it (DK59A88; DK59B9; DK59A57; 
DK59A12; but see DK59A42). However, if 99c1-6 is taken into account, the most plausible 
reference is Aristophanes’ Nubes (365–369, 379–381, 369–409, 826–828), and, indirectly, 
to some of the views ridiculed there, perhaps those of Diogenes of Apollonia (DK64A16a 
and B8; Simpl. in Phys. 153, 19-20) and Archelaus of Athens (DK60A1 and A12). However, I 
will leave the discussion of Plato’s sources for another occasion. 
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The αἰτίαι of the stillness of the earth hang on the possibility of finding a 
stronger answer to the general order of the cosmos than the one provided by 
strong teleological accounts. The Atlas theories assume the Atlas exists because it 
might seem the best explanation. After all, teleological αἰτίαι have been either un-
successful or confined to the human sphere. The Atlas theories just point out that 
there are not sufficient reasons to accept teleological αἰτίαι.26 According to this re-
construction, Socrates has the burden of proof. The thought behind assuming prem-
ise (a) can be understood as an abduction: 
Observation: There is order in the universe. 
Hypothesis: A non-teleological Atlas explains this order. 
Plausibility: A non-teleological Atlas is relatively more likely to be true, at least 
compared to the competing teleological hypothesis (given the present short-
comings of teleology). 
Conclusion: A non-teleological Atlas best explains the order in the universe. 
Therefore, assuming (a) is reasonable. 
If this is the scenario, Socrates needs a counterargument to discredit and reject 
the Atlas theories and their hope. However, nothing he has said up to 99c5 offers this. 
Luckily, (v-vi) can be read―as I have proposed―as a rejection of this hope. No-
tice, however, that Socrates’ complaint cannot simply be that the Atlas theorists have 
not yet found their Atlas. Their main argument (a–f) works just by assuming they 
might find it, something that seems reasonable given the dialectical context. Moreo-
ver, Socrates’ own hopes (finding teleological αἰτίαι to explain not only human ac-
tions but also natural phenomena) could be accused of the same problem. Thus, 
when Socrates says that he was deprived of the Atlas, unable to find it himself or 
                                                 
26 Taken in this way, however, one may wonder whether Socrates’ later argument at 
108e4–109a7 is not enough to reject the Atlas theories. Socrates’ answer there (based on 
Anaximander’s equipoise argument; see Arist. Cael. 2.13, 295b10-16=DK12A26; [Ps.-?] Hipp. 
Ref. 1.6.3–7=DK12A11) is presented as more economical than the one offered by the Atlas 
theories, since it seems to require fewer elements to explain how the earth stays in its 
place. Moreover, it seems that an argument against the Atlas theories could be constructed: 
g. It is not the case that (f) (from 108e4-109a7). h. Therefore, it is not the case that (a) (MT 
from e, and g). But Socrates does not make this argument because, although persuaded by 
the equipoise argument, he admits he lacks knowledge about the matter. Thus, he is not 
really in a position to defend premise (g). Moreover, the equipoise argument would not 
answer what Socrates wants. The argument does not explain why the earth keeps still in 
the middle, only how this is possible. See C. J. Rowe (1993) 271–72. See also D. Furley (1989) 
17. For a teleological interpretation of the passage, however, see D. Sedley (1989) 364–65. In 
Plato, the equipoise argument is also found in Ti. 62d12–63a2. See D. Furley (1989) 17–18, 
23–26, A. Gregory (2016) 147–49, and M. Schofield (1997) 46–48. 
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learn it from another, this has to be taken as denying the Atlas theories’ hopes; a di-
rect challenge to premise (a). But since the reason Socrates offers to reject (a) is de-
feasible (someone can come and find the Atlas after all), he concedes the counterfac-
tual: he would gladly become the student of anyone who possessed the knowledge of 
such a missing Atlas.27  
Despite his best efforts, Socrates could not find a stronger αἰτία than the teleologi-
cal and nor could the Atlas theorists. There is not even a clear path or method to find 
the Atlas, there is only a hope, a supposition that there should be. So, without a 
breakthrough in this search, it is not even a research programme but only wishful 
thinking. Now, Socrates has explained that he was also unable to learn the teleologi-
cal αἰτία from someone else, and if he too had been unable to find it, both theories 
would be on equal footing. However, as I noted in the previous section, this is not the 
case. Socrates was able to find some teleological αἰτίαι himself, and even if they are 
restricted to human action, this success is enough to justify his hopes. From this it 
follows that the second sailing will show how Socrates found the αἰτία of generation 
and destruction by his own efforts, and that this has to include or presuppose the 
original teleological αἰτία. 
 
The Cause of Generation and Destruction 
If Socrates has not questioned his previous views on teleology and the αἰτία in (vi) is 
that of generation and destruction, then the second sailing is not about a new stand-
alone αἰτία that fails to explain generation―as Aristotle wants us to believe. Instead, 
it is the last piece of a puzzle Socrates is putting together and which includes nous, its 
choosing of the best, and thing’s participation in the forms. Let me outline this possi-
bility. 
First, notice that the introduction of forms does not exclude teleology. Socrates 
goes back to show how his new formal answers are safer than those offered by natu-
ral inquiry, which he cannot understand now, and he rejects. But if the teleological 
ordering of nous had been abandoned in the same way, one would expect Socrates to 
offer a similar comparison, examples, and explanations of how answers based on 
                                                 
27 The argument against the Atlas theories can be understood as follows: (1) If Socrates is 
deprived of the Atlas (i.e., a), and he is neither able to find it himself nor to learn it from an-
other, then, as things stand, Socrates cannot suppose he might discover it. (2) Socrates is de-
prived of the Atlas and he is neither able to find it himself nor to learn it from another. (3) 
Therefore, as things stand, Socrates cannot suppose he might discover the Atlas (MP from 1, 
and 2; = ¬a). 
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forms replace teleology or how teleological accounts confuse him, something we do 
not get.28 
Now, Aristotle is right about a couple of things. Forms alone cannot account for 
generation. If that were so, they would generate in a continuous way. Put the other 
way around, forms do not really explain why this or that particular thing became or 
stopped having certain property at a specific time and place, but only why all things 
that have a property are the way they are. Aristotle is also right to point out that 
whatever is produced in something by the participation in the forms is not produced 
without an agent. In other words, forms alone cannot explain why Alcibiades in par-
ticular is beautiful but only why all beautiful things are beautiful. But none of these 
facts are a problem if my reading is correct. On the contrary, they become reasons to 
think that forms are meant to fit into a larger account that includes the previous re-
marks of a teleological nous; one that can really explain the generation and destruc-
tion of each particular thing. 
One may still worry that there is a lot of room between what we can make of the 
textual evidence in the second sailing and my idea of a unified account that incorpo-
rates nous, its teleological activity and forms. In the second sailing, one may object, 
Socrates seems to offer an approach where forms monopolise the causal explana-
tion. Take, for example, the famous passage, where Socrates describes his ‘safest 
answer’: 
T3. Consider, he said, whether you also agree with me as to the following; for it seems 
to me that if something else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it is beautiful by no 
other reason than that each of these things participates in that beautiful, and I say so in 
everything. 
—Do you agree with an αἰτία such as this? 
—I agree. 
—Well then, he said, I no longer understand nor am I able to recognise those other 
ingenious αἰτίαι. But, if anyone tells me why something is beautiful either because it has a 
bright colour, or shape, or anything else such as these, I dismiss these other things. For I 
am confused with all these other things. But I simply, artlessly, and perhaps simple-
mindedly admit this to myself: that nothing different makes something beautiful than the 
beautiful itself, whether by its presence or by communion, or in whatever way it indeed 
happens. For I do not go as far as to affirm this29 with confidence, but only that it is 
through the beautiful that all beautiful things are30 beautiful. For I think this is the safest31 
                                                 
28 Another helpful reminder that teleology has not been forgotten is the myth at 107c-
115a, which has a teleological structure. For an analysis of this passage, see D. Sedley 
(1989). 
29 In d6, τοῦτο refers back to the ‘ingenious αἰτίαι’ of 100c9-10. 
30 Following MS B, which omits γίγνεται here and in e3. See J. Burnet (1911) 112. 
31 Cf. 101a5-6. 
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thing to answer to myself and to others; and I believe holding on to this I shall never be ru-
ined; but this is the safe thing to answer for me and for anyone else, that it is through the 
beautiful that beautiful things are beautiful. Or do you not think so too? 
—I think so (100c3-e4).32 
A common way to express the formal causal principle (FCP) at play here is: 
(FCP) If X is F, then X is F because and only because X participates (communes 
or holds some other relation) in the F-itself. 33 
Now, if this is the core payoff of the second sailing, it is easy to understand why 
some see a tension between Socrates’ previous teleological commitments and this 
approach based on forms. It is not only that there is no explicit mention of nous and 
its choosing of the best. The problem is that it seems incompatible with Socrates’ 
claims that if nous is the αἴτιον of each thing it orders in whatever way is best (97c3–
6) and that there is no need to introduce any other αἴτια (98a8–9; 99a4–5). 
However, this objection can be rejected if, as I have suggested, the text distin-
guishes here between αἴτιον and αἰτία. If this is right, the claim that nous is the only 
αἴτιον is not threatened by the introduction of answers based on the FCP, because 
each of those are an αἰτία, but do not offer a new αἴτιον (Socrates may act justly be-
cause he partakes in justice itself, but he is still the only one responsible for his ac-
tions). Furthermore, there is no textual evidence that each form would count as a 
new αἴτιον, but only as part of the αἰτία for why something has a given characteristic. 
Otherwise, Aristotle would be right. A form cannot be the αἴτιον of generation be-
cause they do not act or, if they do, they would continuously.34 Moreover, even in his 
introduction of the safe answer, Socrates seems to leave room for other elements 
apart from forms that explain how participation happens. When he says that only the 
beautiful itself makes things beautiful ‘whether by its presence or by communion, or 
in whatever way it indeed happens’ (100d5–6), one inevitably wonders what exactly 
explains the form’s presence in some objects and not others. But in my 
                                                 
32 My translation, retaining προσγενομένη at d6 with the MSS. 
33 Later, Socrates introduces safe, subtler, and more sophisticated answers (105b6–c7), 
which are meant to be more informative and observant of empirical evidence, but they ulti-
mately follow this principle. For a discussion of whether these subtler answers count as 
proper αἰτία, see N. Denyer (2007) 93–94 and D. T. J. Bailey (2014) 25–26. 
34 Even if a form were an αἴτιον of some sort it would not be an αἴτιον of generation and de-
struction, and so not the same thing for which nous is said to be an αἴτιον. Socrates is commit-
ted to nous being the only αἴτιον of generation and destruction, which is compatible with the 
existence of formal, inefficient αἴτια of thing’s characteristics in general. Moreover, there is 
no reason to think that the αἰτία of generation and corruption cannot refer to forms and a 
teleological nous as two parts of a single account. 
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interpretation he has already given the answer: it depends on the ordering of 
teleological agents able to think and modify their enviroment. 
This still leaves us with a teleological and a formal αἰτία. Notice that both answer 
to a different ‘why?’ question. One answers to questions of the form ‘Why did S do X?’ 
(Because S thought X was the best), whereas the other answers to questions like ‘Why 
is X, F?’ (Because X partakes in the F-itself). However, none of these answers alone 
can explain why something comes to be, exists or is destroyed at a given time and 
place. On the one hand, a person always acts in a given way because she thinks that 
that was the best. But this does not explain why she thought a specific action was the 
best. The teleological αἰτίαι alone does not explain why nous would choose this ra-
ther than that as the best possible order for something. One may think about it in this 
way. If one asks, ‘Why did Socrates stay in prison?’ and obtains a simple, ‘because 
Socrates thought that that was the best he could have done,’ one could immediately 
reply, ‘Sure! But why on earth did he think that?’ The answer to that second question 
is required for answering the specific question and not something that applies to all 
of Socrates’ actions. The reason is that unless one’s choice of what is best (99a7–b2) is 
unpacked, there is an explanatory gap in the answer. Notice that Anaxagoras’ philos-
ophy is of no help with this problem because mentioning the necessary means for 
Socrates to stay in prison (bones and sinews) tells us nothing about why he thought 
staying was better than any other action within his reach, like escaping to Megara 
and Boeotia. In other words, why his specific decision was best. 
On the other hand, as I have explained, a formal answer explains why any object 
with a given characteristic has such a characteristic but cannot explain why a specific 
object has it (or stopped having it) at a given moment and place. But if my reading is 
correct, Socrates assumes that to answer why each thing comes to be, exists, or is de-
stroyed in a specific time and place, one has to make reference to an αἴτιον, i.e., a 
nous, and both a teleological and a formal αἰτίαι (distinguishing also that there are 
some things necessary for the αἴτιον to be the αἴτιον). 
I am not suggesting that a nous has to have direct access to the forms, though. 
Otherwise, only gods and philosopher rulers would count as causally efficacious. The 
requirement is weaker than that. Any nous, as far as it can think, chooses and acts for 
the best possible order. But the characteristics of the outcome of its action, whatever 
they are, can only be explained by participation or lack of participation in a specific 
form. However, the agent that brought about a specific state of affairs does not need 
to know this to succeed. If I want to warm up some water for my coffee, I do not need 
to know hotness itself nor even that fire always results in hotness. As an agent, I just 
have to believe that fire would warm water here and now, and that having a warm 
cup of coffee is the best possible thing to happen within my reach of action. But no-
tice that if I want to fully explain why my cup is warm now and have a reliable meth-
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od to heat things, I need to know that fire always partakes in hotness, and that every-
thing hot is hot through the hotness. 
This model fits with what Socrates says about staying in prison. Until now, I have 
referred to this as a successful teleological αἰτία, but notice that in fact it offers more 
than that: 
T4. Since the Athenians have decided that it was better to condemn me, on account of 
that I too have also decided that it is better to sit here, that is more just to stay put and suf-
fer whatever punishment they decree. For by the Dog, I think these sinews and bones 
would long have been in Megara or Boeotia, transported by an opinion as to what is best, 
if I didn’t think it more just to suffer whatever punishment the city imposes, rather than to 
escape and run away (98e1–99a4).35 
Socrates is not only saying that he stayed because he thought it was the best thing 
to do; he is also explaining his thought process, the basis for his decision. He thought 
that staying was better because he thought it was more just to receive an injustice 
than to commit one. This is contrasted with the case that, if he had had the opinion 
(99a2) that it was better to run away, he would have done so. But in his case, the basis 
for his decision is a principle that he thinks is more just. To assess the outcome of his 
actions, we would have to ask if actions based on such a principle always partake in 
justice itself. But by contrasting the language of thinking with that of merely having 
opinions, Socrates implies that his principle of action is the correct one. Therefore, 
his explanation regarding why he stayed in prison includes revealing that he is re-
sponsible for such a state of affairs, and that his decision to stay was based on his 
thoughts about justice. If he brought about justice with his actions depends on 
whether his action really partook in justice itself. 
Now, let me test this one more time with a different example. Socrates explains 
that he decided to stay in prison after the Athenians decided it was better to con-
demn him. So, one may wonder whether this model also explains the outcome of the 
Athenians’ decision. When asked the question, ‘Why did the Athenians condemn 
Socrates?’ it seems obvious to answer that it was because they thought it was the best 
possible thing to do, so they did. Notice that my model is not committed to the idea 
that this was objectively the best possible decision. It only requires that a nous, or a 
group of them in this case, thought that was the case. This also means that even if the 
Athenians have done some wrong, the characteristics of the outcome of their action 
can still be explained with reference to the forms, things that always bear them, and 
their absence. They thought they were doing the best thing but since they were mis-
taken about what brings about justice, they put in action a plan that brought injustice 
instead. Thus, a unified reading of the αἰτία of generation and destruction can explain 
                                                 
35 Transl. D. Sedley and A. Long (2011). 
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human failures like this one too. If we read T1 in the way I propose we can offer an 
interpretation in which Plato stays on topic and succeeds in offering a strong causal 
theory of generation and destruction.36  
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